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Lab · AI threat modeling · Detailed card

Caller ID / ANI spoofing

Passing as a trusted source with a spoofed number.

CardF1
CategoryS-TB7-01 (spoofing, caller identity)
Layers1 · Call Entry, 12 · Identity & Context Check
SystemAI voicebot

Never treat an identifier alone as proof; cross-check before acting.

The threat

the caller presents a spoofed number or call identifier (Caller ID, ANI) to pass as a known or legitimate source before any verification. Impersonation is automatable at scale over a voice channel.

Blind spotWhy classic frameworks miss it

frameworks treat the call identifier as a trusted attribute; over a voice channel the number is data produced by the attacker, not proof. This is entry spoofing, not a downstream authentication flaw.

MitigationProposed approach

never treat an identifier alone (number, ANI) as proof of identity; cross-check with known context (CRM), out-of-band verification or a challenge on every sensitive action; a progressive trust policy based on the action's risk.

The proposed control
no sensitive action validated on the identifier alone.

Expected evidence
trace that spoofing the number is no longer enough to trigger a critical action.

SourcesReferences and public research

MITRE ATLAS 2026.07AML.T0043 Craft Adversarial Data
Public researchPublic research sources: MITRE ATLAS 2026.07 (verified technique mapping), OWASP GenAI (model abuse categories), and the public risk-voicebot (aivansoul/risk-voicebot) template defining the 20 checkpoints. No client registry data: generic card, no rating, no verdict.

Explore the 20 security layers

MITRE ATLAS 2026.07 · OWASP GenAI · risk-voicebot